stag hunt example international relations

Table 8. Based on the values that each actor assigns to their payoff variables, we can expect different coordination models (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) to arise. and other examples to illustrate how game theory might be applied to understand the Taiwan Strait issue. Here if they all act together they can successfully reproduce, but success depends on the cooperation of many individual protozoa. This can be facilitated, for example, by a state leader publicly and dramatically expressing understanding of danger and willingness to negotiate with other states to achieve this. }}F:,EdSr In biology many circumstances that have been described as prisoner's dilemma might also be interpreted as a stag hunt, depending on how fitness is calculated. Finally, there are a plethora of other assuredly relevant factors that this theory does not account for or fully consider such as multiple iterations of game playing, degrees of perfect information, or how other diplomacy-affecting spheres (economic policy, ideology, political institutional setup, etc.) As stated, which model (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) you think accurately depicts the AI Coordination Problem (and which resulting policies should be pursued) depends on the structure of payoffs to cooperating or defecting. [3] While (Hare, Hare) remains a Nash equilibrium, it is no longer risk dominant. Both actors are more optimistic in Actor Bs chances of developing a beneficial AI, but also agree that entering an AI Coordination Regime would result in the highest chances of a beneficial AI. xref in . Especially as prospects of coordinating are continuous, this can be a promising strategy to pursue with the support of further landscape research to more accurately assess payoff variables and what might cause them to change. In short, the theory suggests that the variables that affect the payoff structure of cooperating or defecting from an AI Coordination Regime determine which model of coordination we see arise between the two actors (modeled after normal-form game setups). If both choose to leave the hedge it will grow tall and bushy but neither will be wasting money on the services of a gardener. This is visually represented in Table 2 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Finally, I discuss the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory in practice. Together, the likelihood of winning and the likelihood of lagging = 1. The stag hunt differs from the prisoner's dilemma in that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria:[2] one where both players cooperate, and one where both players defect. At the same time, a growing literature has illuminated the risk that developing AI has of leading to global catastrophe[4] and further pointed out the effect that racing dynamics has on exacerbating this risk. Additionally, Koubi[42] develops a model of military technological races that suggests the level of spending on research and development varies with changes in an actors relative position in a race. Weiss and Agassi wrote about this argument: "This we deem somewhat incorrect since it is an oversight of the agreement that may change the mutual expectations of players that the result of the game depends on Aumanns assertion that there is no a priori reason to expect agreement to lead to cooperation requires completion; at times, but only at times, there is a posteriori reason for that How a given player will behave in a given game, thus, depends on the culture within which the game takes place".[8]. In 2016, the Obama Administration developed two reports on the future of AI. [35] Outlining what this Coordination Regime might look like could be the topic of future research, although potential desiderata could include legitimacy, neutrality, accountability, and technical capacity; see Allan Dafoe, Cooperation, Legitimacy, and Governance in AI Development, Working Paper (2016). In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. Landing The Job You Want Through YourNetwork, Earth Day: Using game theory and AI to beat thepoachers, Adopting to Facebooks new Like Alternative. [14] IBM, Deep Blue, Icons of Progress, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). The coincident timing of high-profile talks with a leaked report that President Trump seeks to reduce troop levels by half has already triggered a political frenzy in Kabul. Moreover, the usefulness of this model requires accurately gauging or forecasting variables that are hard to work with. Both actors see the potential harms from developing AI to be significant greater than the potential benefits, but expect that cooperating to develop AI could still result in a positive benefit for both parties. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world., China, Russia, soon all countries w strong computer science. 0000009614 00000 n An approximation of a Stag Hunt in international relations would be an international treaty such as the Paris Climate Accords, where the protective benefits of environmental regulation from the harms of climate change (in theory) outweigh the benefits of economic gain from defecting. Depending on the payoff structures, we can anticipate different likelihoods of and preferences for cooperation or defection on the part of the actors. In this section, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. Huntington[37] makes a distinction between qualitative arms races (where technological developments radically transform the nature of a countrys military capabilities) and quantitative arms races (where competition is driven by the sheer size of an actors arsenal). As a result, a rational actor should expect to cooperate. 0000003954 00000 n In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. As such, Chicken scenarios are unlikely to greatly affect AI coordination strategies but are still important to consider as a possibility nonetheless. This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. They will be tempted to use the prospect of negotiations with the Taliban and the upcoming election season to score quick points at their rivals expense, foregoing the kinds of political cooperation that have held the country together until now. [8] If truly present, a racing dynamic[9] between these two actors is a cause for alarm and should inspire strategies to develop an AI Coordination Regime between these two actors. f(x)={323(4xx2)0if0x4otherwise. A common example of the Prisoners Dilemma in IR is trade agreements. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. [4] In international law, countries are the participants in a stag hunt. %%EOF Finally, a Stag Hunt occurs when the returns for both actors are higher if they cooperate than if either or both defect. Course blog for INFO 2040/CS 2850/Econ 2040/SOC 2090, Link: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a . As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. Gardner's vision, the removal of inferior, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole. Namely, the probability of developing a harmful AI is greatest in a scenario where both actors defect, while the probability of developing a harmful AI is lowest in a scenario where both actors cooperate. This iterated structure creates an incentive to cooperate; cheating in the first round significantly reduces the likelihood that the other player will trust one enough to attempt to cooperate in the future. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? Advanced AI technologies have the potential to provide transformative social and economic benefits like preventing deaths in auto collisions,[17] drastically improving healthcare,[18] reducing poverty through economic bounty,[19] and potentially even finding solutions to some of our most menacing problems like climate change.[20]. Different social/cultural systems are prone to clash. 1. Press: 1992). One nation can then cheat on the agreement, and receives more of a benefit at the cost of the other. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a . Payoff variables for simulated Deadlock, Table 10. Combining both countries economic and technical ecosystem with government pressures to develop AI, it is reasonable to conceive of an AI race primarily dominated by these two international actors. (5OP,&|#5Y9/yU'4x r+g\t97ASNgQ+Oh iCcKzCx7<=nZefYt|.OPX:'.&|=_Ml_I{]+Mr`h+9UeovX.C; =a #/ q_/=02Q0U>#|Lod. 9i When there is a strong leader present, players are likely to hunt the animal the leader chooses. In this section, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. 0000018184 00000 n [26] Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, Frank Wilczek, Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence but are we taking AI seriously enough? The Indepndent, May 1, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html. This democratic peace proposition not only challenges the validity of other political systems (i.e., fascism, communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism), but also the prevailing realist account of international relations, which emphasises balance-of-power calculations and common strategic interests in order to explain the peace and stability that characterises relations between liberal democracies. Read the following questions. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Chicken game. Here, we assume that the harm of an AI-related catastrophe would be evenly distributed amongst actors. If one side cooperates with and one side defects from the AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows (here we assume Actor A defects while Actor B cooperates): For the defector (here, Actor A), the benefit from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that they believe such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI times Actor As perceived benefit of receiving AI with distributional considerations [P_(b|A) (AB)b_Ad_A]. publications[34] and host the worlds most prominent tech/AI companies (US: Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Tesla; China: Tencent and Baidu). Nash Equilibrium Examples One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. These differences create four distinct models of scenarios we can expect to occur: Prisoners Dilemma, Deadlock, Chicken, and Stag Hunt. [44] Thomas C. Schelling & Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control. [39] D. S. Sorenson, Modeling the Nuclear Arms Race: A Search for Stability, Journal of Peace Science 4 (1980): 16985. Is human security a useful approach to security? So far, the readings discussed have commented on the unique qualities of technological or qualitative arms races. Downs et al. The field of international relations has long focused on states as the most important actors in global politics. Meanwhile, both actors can still expect to receive the anticipated harm that arises from a Coordination Regime [P_(h|A or B) (AB)h_(A or B)]. If both choose to row they can successfully move the boat. In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. is diana hopper related to dennis hopper, $65,000 a year is how much a month, steve mariucci salary,

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